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1. Distributed agency: A concept beyond human action and technical means 
 
Usually, the action is where the humans are. Action means moving the body, making 
something, being initiative, bringing about an alteration by force, and expressing oneself 
thereby. Action becomes particularly visible, when there is unexpected reaction to 
something or resistance to somebody’s will. In the humanities and social sciences, action is 
closely associated with the anthropological concepts of man the artist and tool-maker or the 
speaker and symbol-communicator (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1980). Human action – defined to be 
intentional and creative - is often sharply distinguished from animal behavior that is 
characterized as instinct-driven and only tool-using and from machine operation that is 
described as a repetitive and pre-programmed activity. If we continue to define action by 
the demanding features of intentionality, rationality or reflexivity that are attributed to 
humans only, then – no wonder – all other uses of the term action in everyday life and 
actual technology developments would be only metaphors or even categorical mistakes. In 
this case we would miss and misunderstand the massive changes in intelligent machine 
design and interactive media use that open up Pandora’s box filled with thousands of 
agents. These software or hardware agents equipped with belief, desire and intention 
algorithms are able to take part in manifold actions and even to change their action 
programs by case-based learning. Surely, they are different from human actors, but they are 
also different from classical machines and media. Both features, their particular capacities 
of being active and interactive and their growing population in everyday gadgets and in the 
worldwide web of the internet, justify the following enterprise to develop a more 
symmetrical and sophisticated concept of agency. 
 
What are people talking about when they use the word ‘action’ in everyday life? Do the 
youngsters still mean the good old human action, when they are acting in videogames 
inducing an avatar to follow and fight other creatures only by button-pushing? It is evident 
that button-pushing in this case is not the one single and simple instrumental action of 
fighting with swords, but one activity under many others: It activates a cascade of programs 
which themselves activate characters that show contingent action in a virtual action 
environment. The players surely know the fundamental difference between the other human 
actors and the artificial agents in the game; but they are more interested in the interactivity 
and the particular high level of agency that they experience during their interaction with 
both kinds of partners or adversaries: the humans and the agents.  
 
We learn something about the meaning of action, when we listen to people talking about 
the genre of action movies. They do not only mention the human actors who are in states of 
super-activity like running, jumping, or shooting and who are entangled in highly 
interactive situations like chasing one another or fighting with one another. Action includes 
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more than human bodies in interaction. It is closely connected with the activities of high-
speed vehicles, explosives and firing weapons as we know so well from James Bond 
movies. Action of this special kind emerges from accelerated sequences of action of all 
kinds of acting units. The impression and fascination of action is finally produced by the 
many interactivities between the mixed agencies, not by the human interaction alone. 
 
Actually, computer and media scientists use the vocabulary of human action when they 
describe the features of new technologies. Are software agents e.g. really acting like human 
actors, when they ask the user for tasks, when they cooperate and compete with one another 
in the artificial society of agents, and when they assist persons in their daily actions of 
sorting out e-mails, searching for optimal traffic connections, looking for best prices, 
booking tickets and buying investment papers? Is it correct when interface designers speak 
about Human-Computer-Interaction (HCI) and students of Distributed Artificial 
Intelligence call their programs ‘agents’ or ‘multi-agent-systems’ because they are 
constructed with the explicit intention to act like a person who is acting in the name of an 
other person? Action can be composed of different acts, and some can be delegated. 
Collective actions can be unified in a corporate actor like an organization. They can be 
divided between principal and executive agents (cf. Coleman 1990). If the actions are 
distributed between human actors and nonhuman agents (cf. Latour 1988), why should we 
treat this ‘hybrid constellation’ not as a particular kind of a collective actor? 
 
Answering the main question ‘where the action is’ seems actually more complicated than 
before. The introducing considerations have alluded to four relevant changes in the sphere 
of human-technology-relations that ask for some conceptual revisions: 
- The number of acting units and the kinds of action are increasing for the first time, 
since modernity and enlightenment have successfully diminished it by banning 
moving objects and talking trees, inviting nymphs and punishing gods, speaking 
oracles and helpful angels out of the sphere of action into the world of fetish and 
fiction.  
- Instrumental actions between active people and passive objects are turned more and 
more into relations of interactivity between two heterogeneous sources of activities. 
The analysis and design of these relations require a more balancing approach of 
interactive contingency than a hierarchical one of instrumental causality.  
- Actions are fragmented in many pieces and delegated to myriads of pro-active and 
cooperative agents on the back stage where they perform parts of the action by 
mimicking human agency and interpersonal interaction. 
- Actions emerge out of complicated constellations that are made of a hybrid mix of 
agencies like people, machines, and programs and that are embedded in coherent 
frames of action. The analysis of these hybrid constellations is better done with a 
gradual concept of distributed agency than with the dual concept of human action 
and machine’s operation. 
 
In this paper it is argued that the advanced technologies take part in the course and 
constellation of human action and that they do this with real effects, not only 
metaphorically. The first part starts with the search for a useful concept of agency that 
enables the researcher to describe and classify all activities that contribute to the 
performance of an action. The concept shall include different levels of human agency as 
well as different levels of technologies in action (2). The following chapter treats the 
consequences that these activations of technologies have for the human-technology-
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relation. If technologies change their role from passive means into agents and mediators, 
then the narrow concept of instrumental action should be replaced by a broader concept of 
inter-agency (3). This part of the paper culminates in the presentation of a gradual model of 
agency that can be used to describe and discriminate between different levels and grades of 
action without any regard to the ontological status of the acting unit, may it be human-like 
or machine-like (4).  
 
In the second part of the paper the question ‘What is the adequate unit of action?’ is 
answered. It starts with a thought experiment about the question: Who is really flying the 
Airbus? We learn from both views, the humanist’s and the technologist’s one, that what is 
usually called action, like flying 240 tourists to Tenerife airport, consists of many 
distributed actions that have to be coordinated by social organization or technical 
configuration (5). The concept of distributed agency is spelled out during three steps: It 
presupposes many loci of agency, not one actor (5.1). It declares the hybrid constellations 
made of the mixed human and material agencies to the adequate research unit, neither the 
homogeneous social organizations nor the technical configurations (5.2). Finally, a third 
mode of integration called ‘framed interactivity’ is elaborated that may emerge between the 
hierarchical mode of master-slave-relation and the open mode of autonomous systems (5.3). 
 
2. Technologies in action: From artifacts to agents 
 
Human action and technological operation belong to two different worlds: the realm of 
freedom and the realm of forces. Following Kant’s definition, human action is 
characterized by its moral autonomy from external forces and laws. Although humans are 
subjected to these forces, they have the capacity (free will) to give themselves the rules of 
action that may become the general maxims for others, too. Referring to Reuleaux’s 
definition, machines follow the very idea of forced movements. Heteronomy is the 
characteristic of von Foerster’s “trivial machines” that are completely determined systems 
(cf. von Foerster 1985). The dichotomy of tool-maker and artifact is completed by the 
dichotomy of rule-making und rule-following. 
 
This fundamental dichotomy may be helpful to divide between the ontological spheres of 
morality and causality. But it should not be applied to our questions of empirical changes 
and practical consequences. If we want to analyze the gradual changes of advanced 
technologies, the qualitative changes of the interaction between people and technologies, 
and even more, the re-configurations of the hybrid constellations from which action 
emerges, then we have to overcome this dual concept of action and operation. Thus we start 
with a symmetrical concept of agency that permits us to describe and classify what could be 
meant with the feature ‘in action’. On this low level, we look for features of self-movement, 
activeness and self-acting.  
 
How can we decide whether advanced technologies have changed and under which 
aspects? Let us take the five aspects that are often used in the engineering literature: 
technology as motor/driver (“Motorik”), as actuator (“Aktorik”), as sensor system 
(“Sensorik”), as information processor (“Informatik”), and as communicator (“Telematik”). 
Under the aspect of motion, we can state that the gadgets and machines have gained higher 
degrees of self-movement: from one central stationary steam engine towards distributed 
systems of many engines empowered by electric drive, from externally driven carts and 
coaches to self-driven vehicles, called automobiles. Under the aspect of acting and working, 
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we make out a strong drift from crafted tools over mechanical machines to automatic 
systems.  
 
The next three aspects seem to be of critical importance for the level of technologies which 
are subsumed under the label of “smart machines”, “intelligent systems”, “new electronic 
media”, or “high technology” (cf. Rammert 1992). Under the aspect of context sensibility, 
we actually realize a strong tendency away from systems that are completely blind to ones 
that are equipped with a feed-back mechanism up to highly sensible systems that are able to 
realize situations and to adapt their action to changing environments. The greatest steps in 
the direction of activating technical objects have been made under the aspect of 
information-processing: Looking backward, we reconstruct the movement as a loop from 
hard-wired tools and machines whose plans of activities are incorporated in the design of 
the artifact, via flexible machines that are programmed by cards and records towards highly 
autonomous systems that are strongly self-controlling their activities by nested systems of 
computer programs. Last, but not least, the aspect of communication between objects has 
emerged. Communication about the state of the machines’ activity has been the task of 
people observing them at the work bench or in the office of the factory supervision. The 
direction is now inverted: the machines, the gadgets and even the products themselves 
observe the states, places and times of their actual activity and communicate them to the 
people and also with one another via cable (Internet) or radio frequency (RFID). 
 
 
ASPECTS    From     Change    Towards_________________ 
 
Motor     stationary gadget         mobile agent 
 
Actuator    passive instrument       pro-active agent 
 
Sensor     blind machine         context sensible agent 
 
Processor    hard-wired artifact       programmed agent 
 
Communicator  single apparatus        cooperating agent  
 
Figure 1: Aspects of technological change 
 
The actual advanced technologies show signs of increased self-activity under each aspect. 
As they are human-made technologies, they remain artifacts. But they loose their passive, 
blind, and thumb character and gain the capacities to be pro-active, context-sensible and co-
operative. Insofar as the technical artifacts have been put into action by these changes, it is 
justified to define them as agents. 
 
What are ‘agents’? From a technological view, agents are particular computer programs. 
They are written with the intention that software agents can execute actions like human 
agents. That means that actions are delegated to them. The agents divide and delegate the 
action among other agents. They cooperate with one another, thereby moving, being 
initiative and addressing others. They coordinate the cooperation themselves and 
communicate the result of their activities to the human user. In a seminal text on intelligent 
agents, the main characteristics are presented as relative “autonomy”, a particular 
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“reactivity” to the environment, “pro-activeness”, and “sociability” (cf. Wooldridge and 
Jennings 1995). From a sociological view, agents are persons who act in the name of a 
principal, e.g. the owner of an enterprise or as an informant of a party in a strategic spy 
game (cf. Goffman 1969). The business and the secret service agent are bound to the 
general aims of the principal, but they are free to choose the adequate actions. Their actions 
are not blind executions of the principal’s will. Agent-oriented programming and the design 
of architectures for multi-agent-systems follow this social concept of an agent and take over 
other mechanisms of society like cooperation, competition, trust or community in order to 
establish more flexible systems of distributed artificial intelligence. The up to now 
dominant design of a master-slave-architecture is slowly replaced by open systems of 
distributed and cooperating agents. The higher grade of activeness given to the software 
agents motivates the software engineers and the system designers to transfer those social 
and sociological concepts which have been proven as successful mechanisms of 
coordination (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2002).  
 
Technologies are changing on the level of technical systems, not only as concrete tools, 
machines, media, and sign processors. They show higher levels of complexity, they are 
more heterogeneously combined, and they are more complicatedly nested with one another. 
A review of the advanced technological and media systems hardens the impression of a 
radical change in quality, not only in quantity and diffusion of technical objects. The Airbus 
is highly complex in a different way than a cathedral that is also made of millions of stones, 
glass pieces, and thousands of fixed relations between them, or than a Cadillac car in the 
fifties that is assembled out of thousands of exchangeable parts and tackles hundreds of 
variable relations between them. The cathedral and the Cadillac, however, combine 
heterogeneous materials and technologies, but the construction of an Airbus requires the 
integration of much more diverse technologies in an incomparable way. Especially, the 
embedding of so many different programmed physical and information systems in one 
plane produces the system’s opacity that favors the interpretation to be confronted with an 
autonomous being. Stanley Kubrick has obviously demonstrated this strange feeling in his 
“Odyssey in Space” when the computer system HAL that was a part of the automated space 
ship had to cope with contradictory rules in his program, then resisted to human control and 
started to follow its own rules of action.  
 
It is precisely to escape such fantasies of autonomous action on the one side and the 
stubborn notion that technologies show no sign of agency on the other side, why a more 
differentiated approach to the problem of technology in action should be developed. A scale 
with five levels of agency is presented here that may be seen as a first step on this route. 
The principle of its construction refers to the performance of technical objects and systems, 
not to their function. It also refers to the above mentioned aspects and their interrelatedness. 
Examples from different technological domains are given for reasons of understanding. 
This scale shall raise the awareness about different levels of agency and can be used for 









LEVEL OF AGENCY   Description       Examples ___________ 
 
Passive:   Instruments completely moved from outside Hammer; Punching card 
 
Semi-active: Apparatus with one aspect of self-acting   Machine tool; Record-Player 
 
Re-active:  Systems with feed back loops      Adaptive heating system  
 
Pro-active: Systems with self-activating programs   Car stabilization; Help agent 
 
Co-operative: Distributed and self-coordinating systems  Mobile robots; Smart Home 
 
Figure 2: Levels of agency for technical objects 
 
It is not so easy to give examples that are typical of the particular level. The position in the 
scale depends on the precise description of the equipment and the connectedness between it 
parts. A brake can be a simple tool that functions mechanically. It can also be activated by a 
little motor; then it changes to the level of a semi-active hydraulic machine. When the brake 
is connected with a feed-back measurement instrument, then it operates on the level of re-
activeness. Actual brake systems in the ICE or TGV trains are to be allocated on higher 
levels: They are pro-active, because they start their action themselves after having 
monitored and computed critical dates of inner and outer states. When there is also 
communication between the brake systems at the different wheels, then we can speak of a 
distributed and co-operative system. What can be learnt from this example? New insights 
cannot be gained talking about agency on the first two or even three levels. It is completely 
sufficient to use the mechanical vocabulary of operation and determined movements. When 
the parts of a technical system, however, can behave not only in one pre-fixed way, but 
more flexible, when the interaction with other parts or the interaction with the environment 
changes the behavior, and when some parts actively search for new information to select 
their behavior and even more to change their pre-given frame of action, then and only then 
it makes sense to use the vocabulary of agency and interaction in the world of objects.  
 
3. Types of Inter-Agency: From instrumentality to interactivity 
 
What makes it happen that a move, a behavior or any other activity is recognized as a 
significant gesture or a meaningful action? How do we know that a twinkling eye is only a 
body reflex or an intended signal to be willing to flirt? How do we know whether a 
twinkling sign on our screen of our PC is a mechanical mistake, a routine recommendation 
to continue writing at this point or the triggered sign of an unexpected spy software? If one 
follows the social theory of pragmatism, the answer would be: One has to observe the 
sequence of three acts and relate them with one another as a circle of interaction. It is only 
at the end of this threefold interaction process that one can attribute the label causal effect, 








Act 1:  Twinkling eye     Act 2:  Twinkling back    Act 3:  Twinkling and laughing 
 
Act 1:  Twinkling eye   Act 2:  Twinkling back    Act 3:  Looking away 
 
Act 1:  Twinkling eye   Act 2:  Looking ashamed away    Act 3:  Looking also away 
 
These three sequences demonstrate that the meaning of the twinkling eye in act 1 can be 
only ascertained after the next two acts: In the first line, the additional laughing completes 
the interaction circle and makes the first twinkling to a significant part of a social 
interaction called flirting. Act 3 in the second line constitutes the same meaning, but a 
different attitude to it, namely to be not interested in flirting. The two following acts of 
looking away in the third line seem to constitute a different meaning to the twinkling eye in 
act 1: It is an illness of nerves why one does not want to stigmatize the person. What is 
important to state in our context of argumentation, that is the central message of 
pragmatical interactionism: The observed and practiced interactions between the units of 
agency make critical differences and constitute the relevant meanings, not the single act. 
 
This approach is usually applied to interpersonal interactions between human actors only, 
like in the case above. But one can find some hints in the literature that the approach can be 
also transferred to relations between people and objects (cf. McCarthy 1984). For 
systematical reasons and for our particular purpose, three types of inter-agency should then 
be distinguished: 
 
- Interaction between human actors, 
- Intra-activity between technical agents, and 
- Interactivity between people and objects. 
 
Interpersonal interaction constitutes the social world of ‘inter-subjectivity’. It is populated 
by human actors, expectancies and communications; it is structured by institutions, social 
systems and cultural meanings; it is the classical subject of the social sciences. Technical 
objects are principally excluded from this sphere of pure sociality; they figure either as 
neutral means for purposeful action, either as irritating objects from outside the society, or 
they are interpreted as mere carriers of meanings. 
 
Intra-activity is a quite unusual term: In analogy to the relations between people it can be 
confined to the relations between objects, especially between technical agents. It constitutes 
the material world of ‘inter-objectivity’ (cf. Latour 1996;  cf. Rammert 1998). In so far as 
the objects show low levels of agency – according to our scale – and in so far as they are 
strongly coupled in linear, sequential or otherwise aggregated ways, one need not open the 
black box to study the internal operations. If they, however, display higher levels of agency 
and show more loosely coupled relations between the units, like in the cases of complex 
and high risk systems or in cases of distributed and multi-agent systems, one should also 
follow the activities of the objects and describe their intra-activities. Otherwise one could 
not understand the differences which come up, when people get into use relations with 
these kinds of technical systems. For it makes a difference whether people encounter an 
encapsulated system or a cooperating ensemble of agents, a hierarchical fixed order or an 
open network with case-based learning. 
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Interactivity is the term that is reserved for the cross-relations between people and objects. 
It belongs to the hybrid world of “interfaces”, “human-computer-interaction” and “socio-
technical systems”. This boundary territory is widely occupied by the engineering sciences 
and their techno-morph approaches, like the ergonomic models of the user as a body 
machine and a sensory mechanism, or the psychological models of “human factors” and 
“adaptive organism”. It seems that the social sciences have given up this terrain at the limits 
of the social sphere, supposedly because they fear the contagious contact with 
“objectuality” (cf. Knorr Cetina 1998) and “materiality” (cf. Pickering 1995). Exceptions 
from this theoretical withdrawal can typically be discovered in the cultural media and the 
science and technology studies. Bruno Latour has developed the most ambitious approach 
to re-present the things in the polity and to “re-assemble the social” including human and 
nonhumans (cf. Latour 1994; cf. Latour 2005). In my view, his actor-network methodology 
succeeds very well in bringing the “missing masses” (cf. Latour 1992) into the collective 
play, but the semiotics of actants (cf. Akrich and Latour 1992) cultivate a certain blindness 
towards observable actions and interactions and underrates processes of sense-making. 
Basing social theory in pragmatism may perhaps help to overcome such weaknesses (cf. 
Rammert 2007). 
 
Pragmatism’s social theory of interaction has been shown to be fruitful to explain the 
production of social meaning by interpersonal interactions. This appraoch can also be used 
to analyze the relations of interactivity between people and physical objects. Georg Herbert 
Mead is famous for his comparative interaction analysis of two dogs fighting with one 
another and of two men boxing and faking against one another (cf. Mead 1963). He has 
developed a not so well-known, but remarkable piece of theory about human interaction 
with physical objects: Children start to draw distinctions between different kinds of objects 
(own body, outside objects, moving, and living objects), after they had learnt the 
interpersonal role-model of social interaction ( cf. Joas 1989; cf. Mead 1932). They analyze 
the activities and attributes of physical objects by taking over the role of them, as they have 
learned it by playing mother’s or sister’s role. Being heavy, flexible, moving, having an 
outer surface and an inner kernel, making noises and behaving in an un-anticipated way, all 
these features of objects are experienced in the children’s play with stationary, mobile and 
interactive objects. Socialization encompasses both processes, the interpersonal interaction 
between people, but also the interactivity with physical and symbolic objects. 
 
This integrated view on inter-agency has implications for our own enterprise here, namely 
the inquiry into the changing character of advanced technologies and its consequences for 
the human-technology-relations. As long as technologies, like simple tools and machines, 
can be characterized as passive or semi-active means, they are used in an instrumental 
mode: People take and handle them to attain their goals at work or in other everyday life 
situations. The effective action of a tool or a machine is incorporated in its design, like the 
hammer’s long shaft and heavy weight at the end or the engine’s encapsulated explosion 
and the spark generated by the turn of the key. Therefore, the user can integrate these 
objects as mere instruments into his action. One can immediately take this kind of 
technology in use, and one can rely on the fixed function and the repetitious operations. 
One has neither to choose options out of a menu of options, nor is one involved in a 
dialogue with the machine. The only resistance or unexpected re-action of the technology 
would come up, if the machine is out of function or the user is completely incompetent. 
When sociologists speak of “instrumental action”, then they refer to this kind of 
unmediated instrumental relation between a man and a machine or a woman and a tool.  
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Gadgets and machines with higher complexity must be instructed before they start their 
efficient and useful activities. Simple versions of instruction can be already found at the 
classical tool machines: The craftsman instructed the machine by turning wheels and tuning 
measurement instruments. What started as a slow specialization of instructing machines by 
Jacquard cards, paper stripes or record play-back that was revolutionized by the invention 
of computer control and software programming since the 1940ies. The instruction of the 
machines’ activities became a separate domain. In the long run, the devices were 
miniaturized and integrated in nearly every machine and gadget. They were turned into 
programmable machines, interactive media or smart objects. The instrumental use was 
changed: It was the beginning of an instructive-communicative relation between people and 
objects. 
 
The rise of a third kind of relation can be observed when the machine asks back: Can I help 
you? Do you really want to delete the document? Please, tell me what makes you so sad? 
What looks like a dialogue between a woman at the reception and a guest, an assistant and 
his boss or a doctor and a client, that was the beginning of a new kind of relation between 
people talking to the machine on the one side and software programs that took over the 
roles of communicators, coordinators and agents of all kinds on the other side. 
Weizenbaum’s ELIZA-program showed only marginal changes on the program’s side (cf. 
Weizenbaum 1977). The program’s reaction was restricted to take up some key words of 
the client’s answer and to integrate them in a set of pre-given question sentences. 
Nowadays, the software agent technology has developed a much wider range of capacities 
to show higher levels of agency. The agents can deviate from the standard expectations. 
They can choose an activity out of a bundle of activities. They can assimilate their behavior 
to the personal user. They can normalize their behavior by drawing from statistics, and they 
can change their behavior by case-based reasoning. These features of agency force the user 
to conceive the relation, as if an intelligent agent or partner were acting on the other side. 
Under these conditions of contingency and interagency, interactive-communicative 
relations are emerging. 
 
Human-technology-relations change, when technologies are turned into more active agents 
and agencies. The instrumental relation that is typical for using tools at craft work and 
using machines like a tool is fading or only stage-managed as an illusion. The push on the 
button, the foot on the brake, and the click with the mouse trigger the activities between 
several agencies that more or less guide the machine, delegate the information-finding to 
Google’s search algorithms, or confront the user with unexpected offerings and assistance 
because the profiling programs have made the user to an object. The user of this type of 
advanced technologies is neither the master of the machine nor the slave of the 
technological system, neither the sovereign of his action nor the victim of media’s 
manipulation. A different concept is needed to decide the question of mastery or 
manipulation, case by case. The wider concept of inter-agency replaces the narrow one of 
instrumental use and of the perversion of means and goals. The more precisely both 
activities, the agency of objects and the inter-agency between objects, can be observed, the 
more the human-technology-relation shows features of complex and contingent 
interactivity. Then the instrumental relation is only one particular case of an 
interrelationship. Relations of instructive and communicative interactivity are the other 
cases. They shall dominate in the future, because nearly all kinds of technical objects shall 
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be equipped with programmed agency and shall be made able to communicate with their 
environment (cf. Adelmann, Floerkemeier and Langheinrich 2006). 
 
4. A gradual model of agency: Analyzing humans, machines, and programs in 
action 
 
The level of human agency is not necessarily always higher than the agency of machines 
and programs. Now we bring together the two lines of argumentation that have been 
presented before separately. When people are in action, their level of agency is not always 
the highest possible one. They may act routinely, like handing over five 100 Euro notes at 
the bank counter. Or they may even do something without any intention, because they 
follow a hidden curriculum of a repressed desire. Reflexive action takes place, when 
problems arise or irritations emerge in the course of action. Then people can switch from 
subconscious or routine action over to the next higher level of agency, searching for 
alternative courses of action or reflecting on the moral meaning. If one would count the 
activities of people, only five percent could be classified as actions with reflected 
intentions. The rest follows practical reasons that could be mostly explained if asked for, or 
it follows everyday routines that often lack even practical reasons (cf. Kaufmann 2008). 
 
When machines and programs are in action, their level of agency can be higher than usually 
perceived. Cash machines hand over the money like the human actor, at the same time 
examining the client’s identity and credit line, varying the number of notes, signaling 
misuse, and stopping its activities. Even more, video surveillance cameras can be combined 
with pattern recognition software, interactive data-banks, and programs that process and 
mail notices of payment dues. They execute and coordinate actions a lot of police men on 
the street and employees in the offices would be needed for. Very simple dispositions are 
inscribed in this really existing London City law enforcement system. One can imagine 
multi-agent-systems to assist space flights or financial brokering whose software agents are 
equipped with even higher ranges of belief, desire and intention capacities in order to learn 
from reactions of other agents and from changing environments. 
 
When the fundamental duality should be overcome to give all action to the people and no 
parts of the action to the objects, then a concept of agency is required that also works with 
lower qualifications of the case what an action is, on the one side. At the other side, it has to 
be more sophisticated about the question what kind of action do we observe. Thus a gradual 
and three-level model of agency was developed, thereby referring to and distancing from 
Giddens’ three-level model of action and Latour’s flattened concept of agency (cf. 
Rammert and Schulz-Schaeffer 2002). Giddens distinguishes three levels of an action: a 
first one where a difference of state is produced, a second one where a difference of options 
is possible, and a third one where actors can give an explanation for their action if asked 
(cf. Giddens 1984). We do not understand these levels as a necessary condition of action, 
but we interpret them as different levels of agency. We call these three levels “causality”, 
“contingency” and “intentionality”. Latour, however, pleads for a methodological and 
ontological symmetry and reduces all action to his flattened concept of agency (cf. Latour 
1988; cf. Latour 2005). We share his anti-dualistic methodology, but we insist on levels and 
degrees of agency. 
 
On the first level of causality, we start with a weak term of action. Agency of this kind 
means an efficient behavior, a behavior that exerts influence or has effects, like in the Latin 
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term “agere” or in Latour’s term “actant” or Callon’s term “translation” (cf. Callon 1986). 
Under the performative aspect on this level, it doesn’t make any difference whether 
humans, machines or programs execute the action. The money is handed over either by 
cash machines or by bank employees. The situation changes when greater irritations and 
more options come into play. 
 
On the second level of contingency, the criterion of contingent action is required, that 
means the capacity to act in a different way and to choose between options. When the 
environment changes, the routine action program has to be changed and adapted to it, by 
people as well as by programs. Another possibility arises, when the own action program is 
changed in such a way that its consequences are not immediately transparent and 
accountable for the others. When technologies reach this level of contingency, they can no 
longer be used as immediate instruments and do not follow the paradigm of command and 
execution, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. Instrumentality is replaced by 
relations of interactivity. Dialogical inter-faces and internal user-modeling increase the 
action level. Interactive videogames create spaces of high virtual contingency (cf. Esposito 
1995) that simulate human user’s action. These technologies function like a Turing test (cf. 
Turing 1950): They make it nearly impossible to discriminate between human enacted and 
computer enacted characters in the play.  
 
On the third level of intentionality, the species of reflexive and intentional action is 
allocated. As long as intentionality is by definition ascribed to conscious and 
knowledgeable human actors only, this level is the domain of meaningful action that is 
oriented to the supposed meaningful action of other actors. Chess playing programs cannot 
literally have the intention to win a play, but they can be constructed as if they had an 
intentional structure – the philosopher Dennett calls it “from an intentional stance” (cf. 
Dennett 1995). Software agents cannot bodily cooperate with others and trust them under 
the explicit belief to augment their chances to reach a common goal. But they can be 
equipped with an intentional vocabulary by which they really coordinate and communicate 
their activities like human actors do with similar semantics. On this level, we plead against 
a substantial definition of action that excludes inquiries into agency. Instead we follow 
pragmatism, what means to follow all kinds of agencies and to focus on the observable 
practices at which cases the vocabulary of intentionality is used for the control or 
interpretation of activities of people as well as of technical objects (cf. Rammert and 
Schulz-Schaeffer 2002; cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2007). 
 
LEVELS      low       DEGREES     high _________ 
 
III.               up to guidance by complex semantics 
Intentionality:    from ascription of simple dispositions 
 
II.                up to self-generation of actions 
Contingency:    from selection of pre-selected options 
 
I.                up to permanent re-structuring of action  
Causality:     from short-time irritation 
                              
Figure 3: Levels and grades of agency (cf. Rammert and Schulz-Schaeffer 2002) 
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This gradual and multi-level model of agency gives us the possibility to escape the dilemma 
either to reserve agency up to the humans or to flatten the concept of agency unnecessarily. 
We are neither forced to claim that the activities of humans, machines and programs are 
substantially the same kind of behavior. Nor do we have to stick to the conception that 
human action and technical operation are fundamentally different from one another. This 
gradual concept of agency opens up a wide range of possibilities to identify and to classify 
kinds and intensities of agency without regards to the substantial character of the unit that is 
in action. Thus the question where the action is can be transformed into an empirical 
question. 
 
5. Distributed agency: The very idea 
 
The question where the action is cannot be answered, when a second question has not been 
clearly decided: What is the adequate unit of action? Conventionally, we suppose a single 
human actor as the adequate unit of action: the philosopher who is thinking and ergo knows 
that he exists, the employee who hands over the bank notes, the pilot who flies two hundred 
tourists to Tenerife airport, and so on. But let us look more precisely at the streams of 
actions wherefrom an action arises. It arises as a distinct action, because it is put into 
brackets, later-on emphasized, and ascribed to a single unit, an actor or an author. 
 
We would have never heard of Descartes’ thought act, if he had not written down his 
famous sentence with a pencil on a paper. Even more, the working actions of dozens of 
printers were needed to distribute the phrase in hard-covered editions. Additionally, the 
teaching of hundreds of philosophy professors was necessary to diffuse the message under 
many thousands of students. Perhaps this thought act never took place as a single action at 
one place. Descartes was connected with a lot of thinkers receiving their arguments and 
reading their papers. Perhaps the foundational thought act that is ascribed to him could have 
been discovered at many loci in that time, as if it would be very much up in the air (cf. 
Merton 1957). The act of writing interrupts this continuous chain of acts and turns it into 
the unique philosophical thought action that changed the world or at least the world view. 
The act of writing the sentence down by one single actor is emphasized, but both, the flux 
of thought acts before and the sequences of actions afterwards, like printing, distributing, 
reading, teaching and learning, were put into brackets and neglected. It is an efficient 
strategy of teaching and tradition-building to attribute a thought act to one author because it 
reduces cognitive and social complexity. But if we are doing research and inquire into the 
places, faces and activities where the action really is, we should follow all possible actors 
and agencies to the many loci of agency (cf. Latour 1987; cf. Rammert and Schubert 2006; 













5.1 Distributed agency I: From a single actor to many loci of agency 
 
A thought experiment shall introduce the second part of the paper: Let us answer precisely 
the question: Who or what is acting in the case of flying the tourists to Tenerife?  
 
PEOPLE        MACHINES      PROGRAMS___________ 
 
Pilot?         Jet engine?       Auto-pilot software? 
Co-pilot?        Elevator, Rudder?    Navigation card and system? 
Radio operator?      Radio equipment?    Radio signals and codes?   
 
Flight-controller?     Radar unit?       Radar screening? 
Tourist office?      Booking machine?    Reservation software? 
 
Airline company?     Aviation technology?   Technological R&D plans? 
Aviation industry?     Air traffic system?    Roadmaps for infrastructure? 
 
Figure 4: List of actors and agencies in the flight case 
 
Humanists and social scientists focus on the people’s side in the list. Their first and most 
plausible answer shall be that the human pilot is the acting unit that flies the tourists to 
Tenerife. He is conscious of the goal, the methods and instruments. He reflects on possible 
interventions and deviations. Finally, he can be made responsible for the flight because he 
has the power of command and control. But a first uncertainty comes up when confronted 
with the question: the captain, doesn’t he have at least one radio- operator on his side? We 
know from some cases of accidents that the communicative actions between pilot and co-
pilot or between pilot and flight-controller have been critical for the flight action: the 
consequence can be to escape a collision or not. So we learn that agency can be divided 
between several human actors. The acting unit then is either the team at board or the locally 
dispersed assembly of people at board and at several control centers on earth. A further 
question raises other doubts about the single heroic actor: Does the captain or this group of 
navigators and controller really plan the flight action? No, it was the air line which planned 
the route, the time and the final departure. It needs more than 200 paying passengers that 
the action can take place. In comparison to this powerful principal agent the other actors 
fall back in the role of executing agents. The company is the so-called collective actor 
which plans, decides, and controls the flight action to Tenerife. In sum, four different units 
of action can be distinguished on the people’s side: a single human actor, a social group or 
team, a dispersed association of people being in interaction by a division of work, and a 
collective actor that coordinates activities towards a goal. Certainly, human agency is 
multiplied, divided, distributed, and connected. 
 
Encouraged by our gradual concept of agency, one may dare to insist on a more precise 
answer to the question what actors and other agencies contribute to the flight action. 
Engineers and scientists probably would emphasize the role of machines and programs. 
Their first and most plausible answer would be: No pilot and no flight without up currents 
or artificial drivers, like propellers or jet propulsion! Elevators and rudders give the air 
plane the direction, and the radio and radar equipment enables the plane to find its position 
and to correct its route. As we have discussed earlier, the agency on this low level of 
causality doesn’t really add some new explanatory power. But the situation changes 
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completely, when these machine technologies and communication media are in close intra-
activity with the agencies that are enlisted on the programs’ side. For the most time of the 
flight, the flight action and the many sub-actions are delegated to the auto-pilot. That is a 
compilation of many different software programs that are continually measuring, 
monitoring, and computing, but also actively correcting the height, tempo and direction of 
the flight. The automatic landing system sometimes even restricts the human pilot from 
intervening into the action. In sum, the unit of technical agency is constantly changing and 
growing towards a highly combinatory and relatively autonomous technological system. It 
starts with wings and rudders. It develops into an aggregated technological system 
integrating many sub-units like propulsion, navigation, and communication systems. A 
qualitative shift in the level of agency is achieved at the end, when advanced computer 
programs take over the planning, control and navigation activities, especially their 
intelligent coordination, and even more when the flying plane itself is turned into one agent 
in a more extended and self-regulating air traffic system. 
 
At the end, we see that it is not so easy to define a human and, in particular, a social action. 
Philosophical and sociological textbooks may help to think about the criteria. The authors 
usually start with a concept of action that is isolated from the stream of other actions and 
that is idealized in a certain way. The “ego” is the unit that creates changes, chooses and 
defines the situation, like God the creator. One can call this concept of action “agency ex 
nihilo” and contrast it with an alternative one “agency in medias res” (cf. Fuller 1994) that 
reconstructs action out of the many activities before and around the focused action. Flying 
200 tourists to Tenerife is not the instrumental action of a pilot navigating the plane to 
Tenerife airport. It is one activity that is combined with other activities of controlling and 
communication. It is additionally integrated in the commercial activities of an airline 
company. Finally, it is also nested in the activities of a highly complex organized system of 
the air traffic, the aviation sector and the tourist industry. Looking on the activities under 
this perspective, one discovers many loci of agency instead of one single actor. One can 
reconstruct the flight action as a commercial action of a collective actor or even a network 
of organizations (cf. Teubner 2003) which hire people, invest in new planes, lobby for 
public support, advertise cheap charter flights, and organize the flight route. 
 
Looking on the technical side of the list, the talk of gadgets and machines as simple means 
of action underrates both, the complexity of aggregated technical systems and the self-
activeness of programmed and nested systems. The collection of many devices and the 
compilation of different types of technologies cannot be handled like bigger tool-boxes 
with an increasing number of instruments in it. These interrelated parts build highly 
complex systems with many planned intra-activities and some unforeseen interferences (cf. 
Perrow 1986), so that they loose the clear transparency of an instrument and require 
strategies of interactivity for their control. The combination of nearly all parts with 
computing and communication capacities converts them into pro-active agents that often 
are connected in relatively autonomous systems on a higher level, like the automatic 
landing system or the internet based reservation and booking system. As the advanced 
technologies mostly simulate the human actions, the different tasks, roles and competencies 
and actually also the social mechanisms of coordination, it makes sense to describe these 
activities and intra-activities with the vocabulary of action and inter-agency. It is the 




5.2 Distributed agency II: From homogeneous agency to hybrid constellations 
 
In the pre-dominant dualist tradition of thought, the social and cultural world of human 
action and the material and artificial world of technological operation are separated from 
one another. On the one side, social scientists focus on the motives and expectations of 
people, like pilots and flight ticket sellers, and on the kinds of social organization. They 
reconstruct a homogeneous world of symbolic interaction and communication purified from 
physical objects. On the other side, engineering scientists are preoccupied with questions of 
setting something going, like air planes or software programs, and of improving the 
effectiveness or safety of technological configurations. They construct a homogenous world 
of forced movements and functioning technological systems purified from social interests 
and human users. Facing the growing interrelatedness of problems of nature and of society 
like man-made climate change or artificial stem cell growing and facing the co-construction 
of socio-technical systems made of people, machines and programs, one may, however, ask 
whether a non-dualist conceptual approach could help to make these hybrid constellations a 
sound subject of research. 
 
At the borders between the two academic cultures we already observe regular border traffic 
and even conceptual bridge-building. From research in technology and organizations, 
approaches are pushed forward that respond to the strong interdependency between the 
material and the social, like the Tavistock approach of socio-technical systems (cf. Trist 
1981), the concept of large technical systems consisting of people, organizations, material 
and symbolic artifacts (cf. Hughes 1987; cf. Mayntz and Schneider 1988), and comparative 
analysis of high risk systems screening them along aspects of complexity and interaction 
between human and nonhuman elements (cf. Perrow 1984). The most influential 
approaches departed from research in science and technology. Some researchers of this area 
argue against bridging and proposed a radical change of the perspective (cf. Callon and 
Latour 1992; cf. Collins and Yearley 1992), like particularly the adherents of the ANT-
approach, but also of the concepts of “objectuality” (cf. Knorr Cetina 1998), “socio-
technical agency” ( cf. Girard and Stark 2007; cf. Preda 2006), and of “material agency” 
(cf. Pickering 1993). Research in media and culture is actually a growing third branch 
where hybrid constellations are the new subjects, like being a “cyborg”, “technoscience” or 
living in “virtual life” (cf. Haraway 1991; cf. Haraway 1997; cf. Ihde and Seliger 2003; cf. 
Turkle 1995). Bridge-building and trans-disciplinary concept-development can be also 
observed at the science side of the border. Particularly the engineering sciences cross the 
border and take up concepts of the humanities and the social sciences. Interface-designers 
integrate psychological concepts of cognition and sociological concepts of routine-building 
and role-specialization. Designers of software agents apply philosophical concepts of mind, 
belief and intention. And the architectural designers of multi-agent-systems use 
sociological concepts of trust, contractual, and market relations.  
 
From the dualist point of view, it makes sense to keep the two territories separated. A lot of 
arguments can be mobilized for this decision, like the ontological differences between 
people and machines (cf. Collins and Kusch 1998), the epistemological differences between 
the disciplines, the institutional differences between social organizations and technical 
configurations, and so on. But these differences loose their relevance under certain 
conditions: When human actions, machine operations and programmed activities are so 
closely knit together that they form a “seamless web” (cf. Hughes 1986), then it makes 
sense to analyze this hybrid constellation as a heterogeneous network of activities and 
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interactivities. When a human action like flying an Airbus or searching for a certain piece 
of information in hundreds of libraries, millions of books, and trillions of files, when these 
actions can only be executed with the assistance and intervention of hundreds of other 
agencies, then it is urgent to develop a concept of agency that acknowledges all these 
agencies, though they are made out of heterogeneous stuff. And finally, when programmed 
machine operation is developed as if it should execute delegated actions under conditions of 
contingency, and when it is implemented in open systems that are constructed by the 
interactions between the software agents, then one should integrate these agencies into the 
framework of analysis. Therefore I here plead for a concept of distributed agency only 
under these conditions of advanced technologies and instituted hybrid constellations.  
 
Returning to our flight action example, the answer to the question what is the adequate unit 
of action can now be given: It is the hybrid constellation of people, machines, and 
programs. It is the mode how the agencies of the heterogeneous instances are distributed 
and connected with one another and the level of agency that is given to them in certain 
situations. It is neither the single or the collective human actor, nor the technical artifact 
alone or the combined technical system. It is the mixed ensemble made of both elements on 
both sides of the border. One can call it a collective agency alluding to the term collective 
actor. This collective is constituted by the distributed activities of heterogeneous units in 
comparison to the other one that is built out of the homogeneous stuff of human actions.  
 
5.3 Distributed Agency III: From hierarchy to framed interactivity 
 
Two modes can be distinguished how actions can be divided and integrated: a hierarchical 
mode whereby specialized activities are strongly integrated and an interactive mode 
whereby distributed modal units are weakly coupled. In the sociology of organizing, they 
are often referred to when distinctions are made between bureaucratic and organic models 
or between strongly or weakly coupled systems ( cf. Perrow 1986; cf. Weick 1976). 
Observing complex organizations, one learns very quickly that the hierarchical integration 
is only the most effective mode for divisions with fixed inputs, routine processing and 
stable environment, like the mass-production of things. Units that are confronted with 
changing inputs, many variations in the process and dynamic environments require a more 
interactive, flexible and open mode of organizing, like R&D departments or creative 
industries. Most of the modern organizations show a mix of both modes of integration, 
mechanizing the routine parts and learning by interactivity with the environment. 
 
It was taken for granted up to now that the hierarchical mode was the only and one best 
mode how to specialize and integrate technologies. It has yet been the paradigm for the first 
machine made of the forced movements of dividedly working people to build the pyramids 
and also for the ongoing process we call mechanization (Giedion 1948). Technologies are 
defined by their capacity to force different activities into a mechanical form that is reliable, 
accountable and disposable as a mean to solve particular problems in an effective and 
expected way (cf. Rammert 2001). Tasks are divided between many specialized parts and 
integrated by linear chains of operations and hierarchical schemes of processing. But this 
dominant mode and its supposed universality are challenged now. Some technical 
configurations and socio-technical constellations can be observed that are integrated in a 
different mode that resembles the above mentioned interactive mode.  
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One can already observe small deviations from the strong mechanical mode looking at the 
feed-back loops of cybernetic systems. The sandwich architecture of the computer also 
shows a loosening of point to point determination between its physical machine level and 
the logical level and the program language level (cf. Winograd and Flores 1986). A further 
milestone on the path of breaking the linearity was the concept of “distributed 
computing”(cf. Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). It started with the simple problem of 
distributing computing time, but gained its momentum when a new generation of software 
programs were developed that used fuzzy logic, distributed artificial intelligence, agent-
oriented programming, and models of socionics in order to admit distributed activities and 
parallel processes. Particularly in social computing (cf. Hewitt 1977; cf. Star 1989) and in 
socionics ( cf. Malsch 2001; Meister et al. 2007; cf. Rammert 1998), many modes of 
interactive integration were developed that were in opposition to the hierarchical mode. 
 
Another milestone was the development of the concept of “distributed cognition” (cf. 
Hutchins 1996). The psychologist Hutchins criticizes the dominant model of individual 
problem-solving in the cognitive sciences that supplies the artificial intelligence community 
with a construction plan. It presupposes separated and functional specialized activities that 
can be easily aggregated. Being also an ethnographer, Hutchins observed the techniques of 
navigation “in the wild” and “in medias res”: He studied precisely how the Polynesian 
long-distance sailors performed navigation in the wide Pacific ocean though they had no 
sophisticated nautical instruments, and how a navigation team on a warship maneuvered 
their long ship into the small harbor entrance of San Diego though its nautical system was 
damaged. Thereby he discovered a mode of self-organized integration between distributed 
processes of cognitive activities. The cognitive action of positioning was organized as a 
distributed process that was performed by some people with different practices, natural 
objects and technical instruments. The critical point for our argumentation here is his 
observation that these distributed processes did not require any planning, functional 
specialization or hierarchical integration. Their mode of integration was described as a 
natural process of loose coupling, over-lapping activities, experimental adaptation, and a 
step by step stabilization of a common frame for the interactions (cf. Hutchins 1998). 
 
The concept of “distributed agency” that is presented in this paper follows the lines that 
were started by those concepts of “distributed computing” and “distributed cognition”. The 
first step to construct this concept of distributed agency has been to demonstrate that human 
action is distributed between many loci and instances that plan, control, and execute the 
activities. Distributed action means that someone is searching for significant marks, 
someone other is measuring the angles, a third one is plotting by drawing a line, and others 
are counting, communicating and correcting the data. All these interactions between them 
constitute an observable unit of action called navigation. This kind of distribution can also 
be transferred to computer operations. The action of sending a message to a certain person 
can be broken down into many activities at different places, like encoding, packaging, 
addressing, transporting, and reading TCP/IP protocols at the PC, at the server, at the local 
area network, or at one of the knots of the worldwide web.  
 
The second step has been to cross the Rubicon between the two homogenous spheres of 
human action and technological operation: Distributed agency then refers to hybrid 
constellations made of heterogeneous units of agency. Moving objects like the sun and the 
streams of water, measuring instruments, counting tables, and carved records were 
participating in the action of navigation. As we have argued before, objects participate more 
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actively and on a higher level of agency, when the nautical pilot program and the automatic 
navigation system are in action and in close intra-activity with one another. 
 
The third step now emphasizes two modes of integration. They differ in how the units are 
divided, how they are processed, and how they are connected with one another. The 
dominant hierarchical mode of integration prolongs the traditional line that admits us to 
treat even complex technologies and hybrid constellations as reliable means and robust 
mechanisms. The mode of framed interactivity is rarely implemented because it deviates 
from the well-known and trusted master-slave-relation. The technological units are given 
more freedom of choice and higher levels of agency in order to enrich their capacity of 
assistance and to strengthen their role as relatively autonomous agents.  
 
MODES:     HIERARCHY    FRAMED INTERACTIVITY_______ 
 
Type of      Division of work    Distributed activities 
Differentiation   Functional specialization Fragmented units 
 
Type of      Mechanical     Organic  
Organization    Bureaucratic     Open System 
 
Type of      Linear sequences    Parallel processes 
Connection    Strongly coupled    Loosely coupled 
Fixed and general rules  Flexible, situated and specific rules 
Pre-Programmed    Framed Self-adaptation 
  
Figure 5: Two modes of integration 
 
Though the mode of framed interactivity is rarely implemented up to now, this mode may 
become a new paradigm for the design of future constellations. Actually it is inquired at 
many different places: in laboratories of distributed intelligence, in research and 
development clusters on robotics, man-machine-interfaces, or new media design as well as 
in the studios of interactive artists, in the media labs of the entertainment industry, and at 
the software benches of videogame developers. This mode of framed interactivity shall get 
its chance of diffusion when the next generation of technologies is consciously designed 
and implemented under the perspective of distributed agency, when the frames of 
heterogeneous agencies are balanced and consented, and when a new generation of users is 
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